Remote Dashboard
+
+ The dashboard exposes a desktop Remote button. The tunnel is created only when the
+ user enables it at runtime; normal ao start remains local-first.
+
Agent Orchestrator Remote Access
+ Mobile Access V1 Review
++ A practical review artifact for the current branch: what V1 ships, why it is enough + for first release, which security concerns are real, and what should move to V2. +
+
+
+
+ V1 scope
+ Cloudflare quick tunnel plus Basic Auth and QR entry point.
+
+
+ Current status
+ Good for a pragmatic V1 after proxy-auth and shutdown fixes.
+
+
+ Deferred scope
+ Session cookies, token TTLs, lockouts, and rate limits.
+
+ Basic Auth
++ Public access requires configured credentials. Local loopback dashboard access remains + frictionless unless the request carries a real external proxy address. +
+Terminal Proxy
++ Terminal WebSocket traffic routes through the dashboard origin and direct terminal + connections validate the active remote credentials. +
+Runtime Flow
++ Remote access is a runtime toggle, not a new startup mode. The happy path is intentionally + short so it works for quick mobile access without VPN setup. +
+
+
+
+ Step 1
+
+ Start AO
+Run AO normally. Dashboard starts local and local access stays easy.
+
+ Step 2
+
+ Click Remote
+The dashboard calls /api/remote-info to enable remote access.
+ Step 3
+
+ Start Tunnel
+cloudflared is downloaded if needed and starts a quick tunnel.
+ Step 4
+
+ Scan QR
+The modal shows public URL, QR code, username, and password.
+
+ Step 5
+
+ Authenticate
+Mobile browser opens the public URL and signs in with Basic Auth.
+V1 Threat Model
++ V1 is for a user-controlled development machine and a temporary public tunnel. It is + not a hosted multi-user remote-control service. +
+-
+
- Public URL is protected with Basic Auth. +
- Loopback bypass is allowed only for local dashboard use. +
- External proxy headers with non-loopback addresses require authentication. +
- Credentials are simple and user-editable for V1. +
Credential Storage
++ Credentials are stored in the AO global config. This is a deliberate V1 tradeoff for a + local developer tool, and should be surfaced plainly in the UI. +
+~/.agent-orchestrator/config.yaml
+
+remoteAccess:
+ username: ao
+ password: example-passwordReview Findings Triage
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ Fixed
+ V1 blocker
+
+
+
+ Cloudflare tunnel auth bypass
++ Public tunnel traffic can reach Next through a loopback socket. V1 now avoids + loopback bypass when proxy headers contain an external client address. +
+Keep covered by middleware tests.
+
+ Fixed
+ Stability
+
+
+
+ Direct terminal shutdown
++ Shutdown is now guarded against repeated signal handling and exits cleanly after + the server close callback. +
+Prevents noisy stop behavior.
+
+ Fixed
+ Compliance
+
+
+
+ Inline platform checks
+
+ web-dir.ts now uses shared platform helpers instead of direct
+ process.platform checks.
+
Matches AO cross-platform rules.
+
+ Valid
+ Deferred
+
+
+
+ Plaintext credentials
++ Real tradeoff: credentials are stored in local plaintext config. Acceptable for V1, + but the UI should warn users that this is local config storage. +
+Track as V1 UX disclosure or V2 hardening.
+
+ Valid
+ V2
+
+
+
+ No rate limiting
++ Basic Auth attempts are not rate limited. Generated passwords reduce practical + V1 risk, but V2 should add throttling or lockout behavior. +
+Not a V1 release blocker.
+
+ Accepted
+ Low
+
+
+
+ Token secret in process env
+
+ AO_REMOTE_WS_TOKEN_SECRET lives in the process environment. That is
+ acceptable for an ephemeral local process.
+
No V1 action needed.
+
+ Non-issue
+ Verified
+
+
+
+
+ atob in middleware
+
+ Next middleware can use atob. Server code uses Buffer
+ where Node APIs are available. Existing tests cover Basic Auth decoding.
+
No change recommended.
+ V1 vs Stronger Proposal
+| Capability | +V1 | +Hardened V2 | +
|---|---|---|
| Login model | +Basic Auth | +Token login plus HttpOnly session cookie | +
| Credential store | +Plaintext local config | +Hashed/tokenized credential store | +
| Session lifetime | +Browser-managed Basic Auth lifetime | +Explicit token TTL and session TTL | +
| Abuse controls | +No rate limit | +Rate limit, lockout, revoke sessions | +
Decision Summary
++ V1 is enough if the product goal is temporary mobile access for a local developer: + click Remote, scan QR, authenticate, and control AO from mobile. +
+-
+
- Do ship as "remote dashboard access through Cloudflare quick tunnel plus Basic Auth." +
- Do warn that credentials are stored in local plaintext config. +
- Do not describe V1 as a full mobile-auth platform. +
- Do move token sessions, lockouts, rate limits, and revocation to V2. +
Source Files
+
+
+ packages/web/src/middleware.ts
+packages/web/src/middleware.test.ts
+packages/web/server/direct-terminal-ws.ts
+packages/web/server/remote-auth.tspackages/web/src/lib/remote-access-manager.ts
+packages/web/src/components/RemoteAccessQR.tsx
+packages/cli/src/lib/web-dir.ts
+docs/mobile-access-v1.md